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ABSTRACT
Combating the threat of nuclear smuggling through shipping ports and border
crossings has been recognized as a national priority in defending the US against nuclear
terrorism. In light of the SAFE Port act of 2006, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
(DNDO) has been charged with the responsibility of providing the Customs and Border
Protection Agency (CBP) with the capability to conduct 100% radiological screening of
all containers entering the country. In an attempt to meet this mandate, the DNDO has
conducted a typical government acquisition procedure to develop and acquire radiation
portal monitors (RPMs) capable of passive gamma-ray spectroscopy that would allow
100% radiological screening without detrimental affects on the stream of commerce
through the terminals. However, the Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) supporting the DNDO
decision-making process has been criticised and has delayed the program significantly.
We propose an Analytic-Deliberative Process (ADP) as an alternative to CBA for
this application. We conduct a case study with four DNDO stakeholders using the ADP
proposed by the National Research Council in the context of environmental remediation
and adapted by the MIT group and compare the results to those derived from DNDO's
CBA. The process involves value modeling using an objectives hierarchy and the
analytic hierarchy process. Value functions are derived and expected outcomes for the
decision options are elicited from the stakeholders. The process results in a preference
ranking of the decision options in order of value to each stakeholder. The analytical
results are then used to structure a deliberation in which the four stakeholders use both
the analytical results and any pertinent information outside the analysis to form a
consensus.
The final decision of both the CBA and ADP models show good agreement and
demonstrate the validity of both methods. However, the ADP format is better at
explicitly capturing and quantifying subjective influences affecting the final decision.
This facilitates discussion and leads to faster consensus building.
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Title: Professor of Nuclear Engineering
Professor of Engineering Systems
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) is a jointly-staffed national
office established to develop a global nuclear detection architecture, to acquire and
support the deployment of domestic detection systems, and to detect and report attempts
to import or transport a nuclear device or fissile or radiological material intended for
illicit use. One critical DNDO objective is to provide effective systems for radiological
screening at America's shipping ports and border crossings which it currently does with
simple plastic scintillators. Although these systems succeed in providing a high
sensitivity to radiation they have been considered inadequate because of their negative
impact on the flow of commerce due to high false positive (nuisance alarm) rates and a
poor ability to identify illicit radiological materials in cargo with naturally occurring
radiation (NORM).
In September of 2005, DNDO sought to remedy this deficiency by initiating a
solicitation process for new detection systems that use passive gamma-ray spectroscopy
to replace the outdated systems. In attempting to decide between different system
designs and deployment options, DNDO has performed a cost-benefit analysis (CBA)
that includes value judgments on the relative importance of the goals of the program such
as minimizing cost, maximizing detection capability, and minimizing the impact on
stream of commerce among others.
The results of the CBA have been questioned (Aloise, 2007) because several
critical inputs to the analysis are very difficult to quantify in terms of dollars and require
broad assumptions. Previous work by Bier (Bier, 2005) and Keeney (Keeney, 2007)
describe the difficulties in quantifying the probability and location of a possible terrorist
attack and suggest a game theory based approach to find a solution. Smith and Hallstrom
(Smith and Hallstrom, 2004) have proposed a benefit-cost model for the Department of
Homeland Security policies that advocates using stated and revealed preferences to
estimate the consequences of terrorist attacks. Pat&-Comell and Guikema advocate using
approaches similar to the above references for quantifying the full spectrum of terrorism
risks and prioritizing countermeasures. (Pat&-Cornell and Guikema, 2002).
The uncertainties associated with these dollar figures must be necessarily large,
especially when considering the possibility of a nuclear device detonation. Additional
complications arise from the input of stakeholders. The Custom and Border Protection
Agency (CBP), the end user, holds significant influence over the final DNDO decision.
Political influences will undoubtedly play some role as well. Although agencies such as
DNDO strive to make these types of decisions as objectively as possible, subjective
evaluations are unavoidable both in the decision maker's preferences to establish disaster
consequence levels within the rigorous analysis, and in eliciting the opinions of
stakeholders outside the analysis.
The objective of this paper is to propose the use of the analytic-deliberative
process (ADP) as an alternative to CBA for selecting and deploying radiation portal
monitors (RPM's) at shipping ports and border crossings. This process has been
proposed by the National Research Council (National Research Council, 1996) in the
context of environmental decision making. It has been applied by the MIT group to a
number of situations (Weil and Apostolakis, 2001) including terrorism (Koonce and
Apostolakis, 2008). Our approach is similar to the systems approach for prioritizing
terrorism countermeasures suggested Pat&-Cornell and Guikema (Pate-Cornell and
Guikema, 2002) but is tailored to the specific application of DNDO's RPM acquisition
decision and explicitly treats the subjective influences outside of a systems analysis that
inevitably affect these kinds of decisions. The ADP may streamline the decision making
process by providing an explicit method by which stakeholders use analytical tools to
shape their deliberation by explicitly and separately analyzing their subjective values and
objective system performance data resulting in a better understanding of their differences.
The ADP provides the stakeholders with insights that may be helpful in reaching a
consensus. We also report on an actual deliberation held by DNDO decision makers
using this process and compare the results to that of a CBA based deliberation held
earlier for the same decision.
Section 2 discusses an overview of the ADP and how it is implemented in this
problem. Section 3 describes the case study, decision options considered by DNDO, and
addresses their strengths and weaknesses. Section 4 discusses the results of the analysis
and the insights it provided. Section 5 describes the actual deliberation and provides the
final results. Section 6 summarizes our conclusions. Appendix A provides a technical
and practical comparison of the two main types of radiation detectors used in forming the
decision options. Appendix B discusses the influences of Naturally Occurring
Radioactive Material (NORM) on the performance of RPMs. Appendix D provides a
background on how CBA is used today in public policy decision making and Appendix E
provides a brief comparison of the strengths and weakness of CBA and traditional
Decision Analysis (DA) techniques for public policy decision making.
2. METHODOLOGY - THE ANALYTIC/DELIBERATIVE
PROCESS
The ADP methodology (National Research Council, 1996) consists of two major parts:
1. "Analysis refers to ways of building understanding by systematically applying
specific theories and methods that have been developed within communities
of expertise, such as those of the natural science, social science, engineering,
decision science, logic, mathematics and law."
2. "Deliberation is any formal or informal process for communication and
collective consideration of issues."
In our work, ADP is conducted in five steps and is illustrated in Figure 1 (details
will be provided later). The first step captures all the objectives of stakeholders by
constructing an objectives hierarchy or value tree. The objectives hierarchy used by
DNDO in this project consists of the tiers labeled goal, impact categories, and objectives
in Figure 1. In this step, the objectives are also weighted by importance to the
achievement of the overall goal from the perspective of the decision maker. In addition,
value functions are developed for each objective. The second step of the ADP involves
formulating a complete set of feasible decision options that the decision makers will
consider. In the third step of the ADP, the analyst analyzes the decision options to
determine how well they achieve each objective and ranks the decision options from best
to worst based on the decision maker's priorities. The fourth step of the ADP is the
deliberation. During the deliberation, all stakeholders involved in the decision-making
process meet to review the analytical results and consider both the objective and
subjective influences that have led to the final rankings. Influences on the decision
problem that were not appropriate for the formal analysis are typically discussed in this
step. The stakeholders then use the insights from the analysis to build a consensus that
may or may not agree with the results of the analysis. The fifth step of the ADP is to
track, update, and adjust the decision as necessary through the implementation stage.
Since new information and insights may continue to be revealed after the decision is
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2.1 Defining the Objectives
2.1.1 Building an Objectives Hierarchy
Building an objectives hierarchy allows the decision makers to focus on what they
are trying to achieve. The objectives structure places broad, fundamental objectives at
the top of the tree and illustrates how achieving each sub-objective contributes to
achieving the overall goal. The objectives hierarchy used by DNDO in this project is
shown as the middle portion of Figure 1. The procedure begins by working with the
stakeholders to define what the overall goal is that they are trying to achieve. In this
case: Maximize the Benefits ofDetector Deployment. With the overall goal in mind, the
stakeholders then define the categories of fundamental objectives that need to be satisfied
in order to achieve the overall goal. These are the impact categories in Fig. 1. In this
case study, three impact categories were defined: Impact on Stakeholders, Impact on
Cost, and Impact on National Security. Fundamental objectives are then defined that
explain what we are trying to achieve in each impact category. These fundamental
objectives are a set of objectives that are complete, as few as possible, and not redundant
(Clemen, 1996, 533-534). They are also quantifiable, as explained in the next section.
2.1.2 Developing Constructed Scales
A critical step in defining the objectives is to develop a set of constructed scales
by which to measure how well the decision options meet these objectives. The
capabilities of the systems can be mapped onto the constructed scales for which we can
derive a value function. The constructed scales are generally, but not always, represented
by a set of discrete levels chosen by the stakeholders to help them differentiate between
the impacts of the different decision options. For example, for the objective Ability to
detect Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) the false negative rate (probability of SNM
slipping through) describes how well a decision option might meet this objective. A
constructed scale for this objective might look like that in Table 1. The scale is bounded
by worst and best cases for conceivable false negative rates. It includes four levels
chosen by the stakeholders to indicate different capability levels that have different
values to them. The mapping of the performance measure false negative rate to the
constructed scale is displayed adjacent to each level.
Table 1: A Constructed Scale
Deliberation between the stakeholders on what the objectives hierarchy should be
is critical to ensuring that the analysis provides meaningful results. A consensus among
stakeholders on the objectives hierarchy and constructed scales would be desirable before
moving forward. However, if this is not achievable, separate analyses would be carried
out for the stakeholders postponing the attempt at consensus to the final deliberation
(Apostolakis and Pickett, 1998).
Ability to detect SNM





2.1.3 Weighting the Objectives
Once the objectives are completely defined with their constructed scales,
stakeholder preferences for the objectives are captured using relative weights. These
weights can be developed using a number of methods (Clemen, 1996; Keeney, 2007). In
our work, we have determined that the stakeholders find the Analytical Hierarchy Process
(AHP) (Saaty, 2006) easy to use. The AHP requires each stakeholder to make a series of
pair-wise comparisons between objectives and indicate which of the pair is more
important and by how much. Table 2 is adapted from Saaty and displays the numerical
scale typically used make these comparisons. Table 3 provides the results of one such set
of comparisons conducted during the case study. Notice that the responses are inputs to a
positive reciprocal matrix whose dominant eigen vector is used to derive the weights of
the objectives for each stakeholder. For example, this decision maker has indicated that
Cost ofFalse Positives is moderately more important than the Cost of Implementation.
Thus, the analyst has inserted the value of 3 in matrix element (1,2) and its reciprocal 1/3
in matrix element (2,1). This process is repeated until all the pair-wise comparisons are
completed and all the matrix elements are populated. The pair-wise comparisons are
conducted between objectives within the same impact category and the stakeholders
compare them specifically in terms of their relative importance to optimizing their parent
impact category, in this example Cost. The impact categories themselves are also
compared in the same fashion to establish their relative importance to maximizing the
overall goal, in this example Maximizing the Benefits ofDetector Deployment.
Table 2: Integer Scale Used to Conduct Pair-Wise Comparisons, From Saaty, 2006
Intensity of Definition Explanation
Importance
1 Equal Importance Two activities contribute equally
to the objective
2 Weak
3 Moderate Importance Experience and judgment slightly
favor one activity over another
4 Moderate Plus
5 Strong Importance Experience and judgment srongly
favor one activity over another
6 Strong Plus
7 Very Strong Importance An activity is favored very
strongly over another; its
dominance is demonstrated in
practice
8 Very, very Strong
9 Extreme Importance The evidence favoring one
activity over another is of the
highest possible order of
affirmation
Table 3: Sample weighting from the Analytical Hierarchy Process
Cost
False Implementation Life Cycle and Weights
Positives Maintenance
False Positives 1 3 '/ 0.218
Implementation 1/3 1 1/6 0.091
Life Cycle and 4 6 1 0.691
Maintenance
Inconsistency .052
The concept of using value tradeoffs and modeling to set Department of
Homeland Security priorities has been advocated by Keeney (Keeney, 2007) for strategic
planning. The AHP method offers a tremendous counterpart for operational decisions
such as the selection of an overall detector deployment plan because it is robust enough
to effectively encompass both broad strategic goals and specific tactical goals through its
use of an objectives hierarchy. The AHP also provides a mechanism to check and ensure
the stakeholders answer relatively consistently through the use of a consistency ratio.
The MIT group asks each stakeholder to individually complete the AHP. This allows for
the quantification of each person's preferences which can then be discussed during
deliberation.
2.1.4 Developing Value Functions
The next step in developing the objectives hierarchy structure is to develop a
simple value rating scheme for the levels of the constructed scales. The stakeholders
must establish the relative worth of the different levels of each constructed scale, and in
the case where there are uncertainties associated with the decision outcomes, those
relative worths must be evaluated with utility theory. Several techniques for developing
these functions with utility theory are readily available in the literature (Keeney and
Raiffa, 1976; Clemen, 1996; Hughes 1986). In our case study, there are no significant
uncertainties associated with the performance capabilities of the decision options (at least
in the unclassified version of the information provided to us by DNDO) and we use a
simpler subjective rating technique derived from Clemen's ratio technique (Clemen,
1996, pp. 544-545) to assist the stakeholders in creating value functions. In using this
technique, the analyst used a 1 to 9 scale similar to the scale used in weighting the
objectives (see Figure 1) and asked the stakeholders to identify how much value was
added by improving a system's expected outcome by one level on each constructed scale.
The stakeholders always started with a worst case scenario and incrementally assessed
the increases in value until the best case scenario was achieved for each objective. An
example of a value function computed for our case study is shown in Table 4 below.
Table 4: Sample Value Function
Ability to Detect SNM





Notice that in Table 4 the unweighted value function is between unity for the best
possible outcome and zero for the worst possible outcome just as with a utility function.
The stakeholder is then prompted to provide input to establish the relative worth of the
middle levels on this normalized scale. The unweighted value function is multiplied by
the priority ranking (relative weight) for its objective, in this case Ability to Detect SNM,
to determine the weighted value function. This particular example shows an aversion to
any score less than good for Ability to Detect SNM.
2.2 Formulating the Decision Options
The second step is to generate the decision options that will be considered. The
decision options should be broad enough to cover all realistic alternatives, should be
screened for feasibility and ability to meet any absolute requirements (Screening
Criteria), and should be specific to the given problem. The total number of decision
options should, however, be kept to a reasonable level that does not unnecessarily burden
the analysis. The correct number of decision options to consider for each problem will be
unique and specific to that problem and the analytical approach should be flexible enough
to quickly incorporate additional decision options later in the process if new information
or insights warrant it.
In this case study, the decision options consist of different combinations of
detector systems and different deployment options.
2.3 Analyzing and Ranking the Decision Options
The third step in the ADP is to analyze and rank the decision options. The
expected performances of the each decision option are predicted for each performance
measure using whichever modeling, prototype testing, or simulation technique is most
appropriate. In our case study, DNDO had already performed a robust set of testing and
modeling on the decision options; these were unavailable to us because of their sensitive
nature. As an alternative to using actual test data we elicited the expert opinion of our
stakeholders who had access to the test results. This method allowed the stakeholders to
categorize the performances of the different decision options without revealing sensitive
data to unclassified sources. The result was four independent sets of expert opinion,
derived from the same data, which indicated four slightly different interpretations of their
test results.
A Performance Index (PI) is then calculated for each of the decision options. The
performance index for the jth decision option, PIj, is defined as the sum of values vi,
associated with the jth decision option's values calculated for the ith objective. In
equation 1, N refers to the total number of objectives defined for the specific decision
problem. This PI calculation is valid for an additive ordinal utility or value function such
as ours that meets the criteria of mutual preferential independence as defined by Clemen
(Clemen, 1996, 579-580).
P1I = v, (1)i=1
The performance index is used to rank the decision options for each stakeholder
individually. The decision option rankings for each stakeholder along with an analysis of
major contributing factors to the ranking are presented to each stakeholder to objectively
communicate what each stakeholder prefers and why. Additionally, a sensitivity analysis
should accompany the rankings. The sensitivity analysis addresses whether changes in
the stakeholder's preferences could affect the final rankings. If the results are revealed to
be sensitive to a particular preference, the stakeholder is asked to review their choices to
insure that they accurately reflect their preferences.
2.4 The Deliberation
The fourth step in the ADP, the deliberation, allows the stakeholders to review the
results of the analysis, discuss their similarities and differences, and work towards a
consensus. The analysis is not intended to result in a final decision. Instead, it is
designed to facilitate the deliberation by providing each stakeholder with a thorough
understanding of how their preferences affect the decision. The effectiveness of ADP in
facilitating deliberation has been demonstrated by the MIT group (Koonce, Apostolakis,
and Cook, 2008; Apostolakis and Lemon, 2005; Apostolakis and Pickett, 1998) and
primarily stems from its ability to allow the stakeholders to understand each other's
points of view. The analysis can clearly separate critical points of agreement and
disagreement from those that are unimportant which focuses the deliberation on areas
critical to reaching a well informed consensus. The end product of the deliberation
should be a final decision, although this is not always the result of the initial deliberation.
It is common for the stakeholders to view the results of the analysis, gain additional
insight into the problem, and ask to revise their preferences accordingly. This may result
in an additional deliberation session before the final decision is made. The form of the
final decision is not limited to the set of initial decision options. In a previous case study
(Apostolakis and Pickett, 1998), as well as this case study, the final decision was a hybrid
of different initial decision options that best suited the values of the group.
2.5 Track, Update and Adjust Through Implementation
The ADP method does not stop when the group reaches a consensus. The fifth
step of the ADP is to track, update, and adjust the decision as necessary through the
implementation stage. As implementation of a decision begins uncertainties in outcomes
will diminish which may affect which option is preferred. For example, if DNDO selects
and installs a primary detection system in part of a phased implementation plan only to
find it does not perform as well as expected, they may wish to reconsider large scale
implementation before proceeding. If this possibility is anticipated and planned for, then
the ADP can easily become part of a multistage decision model. The ability to anticipate
for and make adjustments in the final decision is situational dependant, but as in this case
study, it can often be planed for as part of the final decision.
3. THE CASE STUDY
The Safe Port Act of 2006 (Congressional bill H.R. 4954) requires the
government to conduct radiological screening of all cargo entering the United States.
With 27x106 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs)' of cargo passing through shipping
ports and 8.7x106 loaded truck containers crossing our borders in 2006 (US Dept of
Trans. Maritime Administration, 2007) achieving 100% inspection is clearly impossible
without serious impacts on trade. The DNDO's initial action to meet this mandate was to
procure and deploy radiation portal monitors equipped with Poly-vinyl Toluene (PVT)
scintilators at the US's major shipping ports and border crossings for radiological
screening. These RPMs provide a high sensitivity to radiation but cannot identify the
isotope present in any but the most ideal situations (Stomswold et al, 2003). To provide
isotope identification, the DNDO and CBP established a primary/secondary inspection
system where containers identified as having a radiation signature are diverted to a
secondary inspection area where CBP agents use hand-held radio-isotope identifier
devices (RIlDs) (Oxford, 2007) to identify the source of the radiation. Although
ultimately effective in conducting radiological screening, the lack of spectroscopic
capability for primary inspections leads to an abundance of lengthy secondary
inspections, the vast majority of which simply identify NORM in the cargo and are
categorized at nuisance alarms(Oxford, 2007; CBP News Release, 2008).
One TEU represents the cargo capacity of a standard shipping container 20 feet long and 8 feet wide. The
height of a TEU can range from 4.25 feet to 9.5 feet.
3.1 System Requirements
To provide a better chance of SNM detection and cut down on nuisance alarms,
the DNDO solicited for industry to develop radiation portal monitors capable of passive
gamma ray spectroscopy in 2005 to replace the current systems. The new systems
designed for this purpose were required to fit the current inspection architecture and
provide the 100% radiological screening required by law. In addition, they should not
have lower sensitivity to radiation. Systems meeting these initial constraints were then
judged on their expected false positive and false negative rates, implementation and
maintenance costs, ruggedness, impact on terminal operations, and other criteria. In
2006, DNDO conducted an initial prototype testing and conducted an initial CBA
according to government acquisition rules and procedures (Oxford, 2007).
3.2 The Decision Options
Currently three prototypes remain in competition, two based on sodium-iodide
(Nal) scintillators and a third that uses high-purity germanium (HPGe) semi-conductors
as an absorption medium. These represent two fundamentally different sets of detection
and cost expectations (Knoll, 2000; Ely, Siciliano, and Kouzes,2004). The decision
options in our case study are based on generalized capabilities of Nal and HPGe detectors
and are not vendor specific.
The Oxford reference (Oxford, 2007) lists the decision options considered by
DNDO during the initial CBA. Since then, the decision options have continued to evolve
as additional and better cost estimates and prototype testing are completed. The
stakeholders participating in this research agreed to the decision options listed in Table 5
as representative of actual decision options currently being considered in their CBA.
Table 5: Decision Options2
Option Name Explanation
A No Uses current PVT detectors for primary inspection and
Change hand-held radio-isotope identifier devices (RIIDs) for
secondary inspections
B PVT-NaI Uses current PVT detectors for primary inspection and
replaces RIIDS with Nal based system for secondary
inspections
C NaI-HPGe Replaces current PVT detectors with Nal detectors for
primary inspections and uses high resolution HPGe
detectors for secondary inspections
D Hybrid Small throughput ports use PVT detectors and large
throughput ports use Nal detectors for primary
inspections. All ports use HPGe detectors for secondary
inspections
E Nal-Nal Replaces current PVT detectors with Nal detectors for
primary inspections and uses Nal detectors with a longer
dwell time for secondary inspections
None of the decision options considered by DNDO used HPGe detectors in a
primary inspection mode. Although the initial CBA did consider this possibility, DNDO
later determined that the resolving time required for HPGe to complete an inspection was
too long for it to be used in this way. DNDO concluded that the longer resolving time
required by HPGe would backlog cargo flow through the port to the point of making this
option unfeasible (Ely, Siciliano, and Kouzes, 2004).
2Acronyms: PVT: Poly-vinyl Toluene scintillator detector, Nal: Sodium-Iodide scintillator detector, HPGe:
High Purity Germanium semi-conductor detector, RIIDs: Radio-Isotope Identification Devices
3.3 The Need for Decision Analysis
The CBA completed by DNDO has come under debate by the Government
Accountability Office (GAO)( Aloise 2006; Aloise, 2007) and other agencies have been
asked to provide additional decision analysis support for the project including the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and the National Academy of Science
(Senate Press Release, 2007). DNDO also agreed to work with the MIT group and
analyze the problem using the ADP. Specifically, four stakeholders directly involved in
DNDO decision making regarding this project agreed to meet with the researcher and
complete the ADP.
3.4 The Stakeholders
The primary stakeholders consisted of an Assistant Director, a Principal Deputy
Assistant Director, and a Program Manager directly involved in the acquisition process
and a Deputy Assistant Director involved in transformation research and development for
DNDO and intimately interested in the project. A Deputy Director from CBP was also
consulted to gain insight into CBP priorities for the project and preferences. A workshop
was held with the group to agree upon an objectives hierarchy as a group. Then the
researcher individually met with each stakeholder to complete their objective preferences,
value functions, and assessments of decision option outcomes. The group then came
back together to deliberate on the results of the analysis and reach a decision.
4. RESULTS
4.1 The Objectives Hierarchy
The first workshop with the DNDO stakeholders resulted in the formation of the
objectives hierarchy displayed in Figure 1. The overall goal of Maximizing Detector
Deployment was divided into three attributes requiring optimization and six independent
objectives that would impact the optimization of those attributes.
While deliberating on the formation of the Objectives Hierarchy the Stakeholder
Impact category brought about a large discussion on how to define this impact on
DNDO's decision making. The input of the CBP Agency was clearly influential. As a
sister branch of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the end user of the
system, all DNDO stakeholders agreed that the level of approval from CBP would be
important to their decision. One stakeholder went as far as to say that no system could
move forward if CBP didn't approve of it. Further analysis and discussion indicated that
the influence of other stakeholders such as the shipping industry and terminal operators
all directly influenced the opinions of CBP. Thus, the majority of stakeholders agreed
that CBP input was representative of all external stakeholders relevant to their decision
model. Stakeholder D disagreed with this grouping scheme and was adamant that the
influence of the terminal operators, those that run commercial operations at the ports,
should be considered separately. Therefore, an additional objective of optimizing
Terminal Operator Input was added in this stakeholder's objectives hierarchy.
4.2 The Constructed Scales
The DNDO stakeholders agreed that the objectives listed in Table 6 fully
described what the agency was attempting to achieve by investing in new, passive
spectroscopic RPMs. The constructed scales and performance measures in Table 6 were
also agreed to in the first workshop with the exception that most scales were initially
defined with only three levels. Through the course of the analysis, it became clear that
four levels were necessary to properly differentiate the expected outcomes of the decision
options.
The constructed scales involving measurable costs, false negative and false
positive rates were given specific, measurable ranges in the analysis but the actual use of
the scales by the stakeholders varied somewhat. This indicated that the true criteria
distinguishing between different levels on the constructed scale was slightly flexible and
lead to different assessments of system capabilities
Table 6: Constructed Scales and Performance Measures
Objective Level Constructed Scale Performance Measure
CBP Input 4 Approval Level of CBP Approval for the
3 OK-Ambivlant diecision option
2 Minor Objections
1 Major Objections




Cost of False Positives 4 Excellent Expected False Positive (Nuisance Alarm)
3 Good Rate for containers with Naturally Occuring
2 Fair Radiation (NORM)
1 Poor




Maintenance and Lifecycle 4 Low Expected annual maintainance and
(M&LC) Costs 3 Medium replacement costs per system
2 Medium-High
1 High
Ability to Detect Radiological 4 Excellent Expected false negative rate for containers
Dispersion Device (RDD) Materials 3 Good with bare or lightly shielded RDD Materials.
2 Fair
1 Poor
Ability to Detect Special 4 Excellent Expected false negative rate for containers
Nuclear Materials (SNM) 3 Good with bare or lightly shielded SNM
2 Fair
1 Poor
4.3 The Weights of the Objectives
Once the stakeholders reached a consensus on the objectives hierarchy and
constructed scales the analyst elicited weights for the objectives from each stakeholder
using the AHP. Figure 2 shows the weights assigned to the objectives by each
stakeholder.
Objective Weights by Stakeholder













Figure 2: Objective Weights by Stakeholder
The Ability to Detect SNM clearly dominates all other objectives for each
stakeholder. This is not unexpected as DNDO reports a similar finding from their Cost-
Benefit Analysis. The consequences of a possible nuclear terrorist explosion, though
difficult to quantify, are orders of magnitude higher than any other possible consequence.
Therefore, DNDO will always choose the decision option that performs best for this
objective and only consider the others in the event of tie.
The relative importance of the other objectives varied among the stakeholders.
However, all stakeholders ranked Implementation Costs last. The typical justification for
marginalizing implementation costs was that the majority of the implementation costs are
derived from the cost of installation which is approximately a constant across the
decision options. Although there are very obvious differences in purchase costs, the
importance of these differences is diminished by the installation costs. Some
stakeholders were surprised to discover that the Cost of False Positives also received a
low weight from all stakeholders despite the fact that it was a driving factor to initiate the
program. Further discussion revealed that the Cost of False Positives was not completely
independent from CBP Input. A discussion with a CBP deputy director revealed that the
opinions of CBP depended on several factors including the effect on stream of commerce,
inputs from commercial shippers and terminal operators, and manpower required to run
the inspection stations among others. Of these factors, both the stream of commerce and
manpower requirement are affected directly by the nuisance alarm rate. Nuisance alarms
require secondary inspections which slow down the stream of commerce and require
additional CBP personnel to perform.
4.4 The Value Functions
Unweighted value functions for the each objective were elicited from each
stakeholder using a variant of the ratio technique described by Clemen (Clemen, 1996).
In using this technique, the analyst used a I to 9 scale similar to the scale used in
weighting the objectives and asked the stakeholders to identify how much value was
added by improving a system's capability by one level on each constructed scale. The
stakeholders always started with a worst case scenario and incrementally assessed the
increases in value until the best case scenario was achieved for each objective. The
results of this exercise are displayed in Figure 3 below.
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Figure 3: Value Functions for Each Stakeholder
The value functions displayed in Figure 3. are discrete. The values to the
stakeholder of each level of the constructed scale are represented by the discrete points in
Figure 3. The dotted lines connecting the points are for communication purposes only.
The results indicate that stakeholders A, B and D generally had an aversion to any
score less than optimal in each category. Only stakeholder C scored the second best level
on a constructed scale above 0.5 in most cases. Further analysis indicated that
stakeholder C's perspective on the project varied from that of the other three in that he
viewed the most important function of the RPM was as a deterrent while the others
viewed it as the actual capability to detect SNM and RDDs. This resulted in stakeholder














philosophies were most prevalent was the Cost of False Positives. Here, most
stakeholders believed there was no value in a system that did not at least perform "Good"
at minimizing this cost whereas stakeholder C's value function still remained linear.
4.5 The Expected Outcomes
The expected impacts of each decision option were elicited from each stakeholder
separately. DNDO has invested significant resources into analyzing and testing the
capabilities of the prototypes they are considering and has accumulated a wealth of
information regarding their capabilities. Because of the sensitive nature of the data,
DNDO did not feel comfortable releasing their specific test results to open sources.
However, all four stakeholders were very familiar with the data and could make more
general assessments of the expected outcomes using our constructed scales. Their
assessments, presented in Table 7, varied despite the fact that each stakeholder had access
to the same reports and test results and were sensitive to the stakeholder's interpretation
of the data available. For example, the primary attribute for the objective Minimize the
Cost of False Positives was the expected false positive rate, but the capability of the
system to cope with false positives once they occurred was also considered. When
additional criteria such as this one were substantial enough to affect the expected
outcome for a decision option, the result was discussed among the stakeholders during
deliberation. The resulting distribution of expected outcomes among the stakeholders
acted as a form of sensitivity analysis for the group as a whole. Additionally, a
sensitivity analysis for each stakeholder's results was presented during the deliberation.
Table 7: Expected Outcomes for the Decision Options
Expected Outcomes for the Decision Options
Decision Option A (No Chanae)
Stakeholder A Stakeholder B Stakeholder C Stakeholder D
CBP Input Minor Objections Minor Objections Major Objections Major Objections
False Positives Poor Poor Poor Poor
Implementation Costs Low Low Low Low
Maintenance/Life Cycle Low Low Low Low
RDD Detection Good Excellent Poor Poor
SNM Detection Poor Poor Poor Poor
Decision Option B (PVT-Nal)
Stakeholder A Stakeholder B Stakeholder C Stakeholder D
CBP Input Approval Minor Objections Minor Objections OK-Ambivalent
False Positives Good Excellent Poor Fair
Implementation Costs Medium Medium Medium Medium
Maintenance/Life Cycle Medium Medium Medium Medium-High
RDD Detection Excellent Excellent Fair Good
SNM Detection Good Good Poor Poor
Decision Option C (Nal-HPGe)
Stakeholder A Stakeholder B Stakeholder C Stakeholder D
CBP Input Major Objections Major Objections Major Objections Minor Objections
False Positives Excellent Excellent Fair Excellent
Implementation Costs High High High High
Maintenance/Life Cycle High High High High
ROD Detection Excellent Excellent Good Excellent
SNM Detection Excellent Excellent Good Excellent
Decision Option D (Hybrid)
Stakeholder A Stakeholder B Stakeholder C Stakeholder D
CBP Input Minor Objections Approval Approval OK-Ambivalent
False Positives Good Good Good Fair
Implementation Costs Medium Medium Medium Medium-High
Maintenance/Life Cycle Medium Medium Medium Medium
RDD Detection Excellent Excellent Good Good
SNM Detection Good Excellent Good Good
Decision Option E (Nal-Nal)
Stakeholder A Stakeholder B Stakeholder C Stakeholder D
CBP Input Approval Approval Ok-Ambivilant Minor Objections
False Positives Excellent Excellent Excellent Good
Implementation Costs Medium-High Medium-High Medium-High Medium-High
Maintenance/Life Cycle Medium-High Medium-High Medium-High Medium
RDD Detection Excellent Excellent Excellent Good
SNM Detection Excellent Excellent Excellent Good
4.6 The Performance Index
The PI's of the decision options were calculated using equation 1 and in essence
summed the values of the decision option's abilities to meet the objectives from the
perspective of each stakeholder. The calculation of P1 uses an additive value function.
Clemen states that this type of function is valid under conditions of mutual preferential
independence. "An attribute Y is said to be preferentially independent of X if preferences
for specific outcomes of Y do not depend on the level of attribute X." (Clemen, 1996, p.
579) The attributes of this decision problem meet this criterion and therefore an additive
utility function is valid. For example, lower maintenance costs will always be preferable
regardless of the level of CBP approval. The P1 results from our case study are displayed
in Figure 4 and Table 8.
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Figure 4: Performance Indices of the Decision Options for each stakeholder
The P1 results did not show a clearly preferred option for all stakeholders.
Stakeholders A and C preferred Nal-Nal while stakeholder B preferred Hybrid and
stakeholder D Nal-HPGe. The P1 results did indicate that the No Change and PVT-Nal
options were clearly not preferred and should be eliminated from further consideration.
For the remaining three options, the preferred decision options clearly demonstrated
sensitivity to the Ability to Detect SNM for all stakeholders. Stakeholders A and B both
rated two decision options excellent in this category and in both cases their answers were
sensitive to CBP Input and Maintenance and Life Cycle Costs with Stakeholder A
judging Nal-Nal superior in achieving these objectives and Stakeholder B judging the
Hybrid superior. Stakeholder D's preference for the NaI-HPGe option was unique and
based on a difference of opinion in the Nal-HPGe's expected outcome for Ability to
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Detect SNM. These opinion differences were the focus of the deliberation in which the
final decision was made.
Table 8: Performance Index Calculations
Performance Index for the Decision Options
Stakeholder A
Decision Option
Objective A B C D E
Ability to Detect SNM 0.0000 0.3198 0.6396 0.3198 0.6396
Ability to Detect RDD 0.0533 0.0914 0.0914 0.0914 0.0914
Terminal Operator Input 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
CBP Input 0.0180 0.0810 0.0000 0.0180 0.0810
Cost of False Positives 0.0000 0.0158 0.0528 0.0158 0.0528
Implementation Costs 0.0254 0.0145 0.0000 0.0145 0.0073
Maintenance and Life Cycle Costs 0.1098 0.0487 0.0000 0.0487 0.0244
Total 0.2065 0.5712 0.7838 0.5082 0.8965
Stakeholder B
Decision Option
Objective A B C D E
Ability to Detect SNM 0.0000 0.2747 0.6867 0.6867 0.6867
Ability to Detect RDD 0.0763 0.0763 0.0763 0.0763 0.0763
Terminal Operator Input 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
CBP Input 0.0517 0.0517 0.0000 0.1760 0.1760
Cost of False Positives 0.0000 0.0000 0.0133 0.0048 0.0133
Implementation Costs 0.0056 0.0031 0.0000 0.0031 0.0011
Maintenance and Life Cycle Costs 0.0422 0.0232 0.0000 0.0232 0.0084
Total 0.1758 0.4290 0.7763 0.9701 0.9618
Stakeholder C
Decision Option
Objective A B C D E
Ability to Detect SNM 0.0000 0.0000 0.4854 0.4854 0.6472
Ability to Detect RDD 0.0000 0.0308 0.0616 0.0616 0.0808
Terminal Operator Input 0.0000 0.0654 0.0000 0.0654 0.0654
CBP Input 0.0000 0.0218 0.0000 0.0545 0.0354
Cost of False Positives 0.0000 0.0000 0.0126 0.0251 0.0377
Implementation Costs 0.0035 0.0024 0.0000 0.0024 0.0012
Maintenance and Life Cycle Costs 0.0128 0.0090 0.0000 0.0090 0.0043
Total 0.0163 0.1294 0.5596 0.7034 0.8720
Stakeholder D
Decision Option
Objective A B C D E
Ability to Detect SNM 0.0000 0.0000 0.6396 0.4567 0.4567
Ability to Detect RDD 0.0000 0.0457 0.0914 0.0457 0.0457
Terminal Operator Input 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
CBP Input 0.0000 0.0607 0.0304 0.0607 0.0304
Cost of False Positives 0.0000 0.0198 0.0528 0.0000 0.0198
Implementation Costs 0.0254 0.0178 0.0000 0.0076 0.0076
Maintenance and Life Cycle Costs 0.1098 0.0300 0.0000 0.0549 0.0549
Total 0.1352 0.1740 0.8142 0.6256 0.6151
4.7 The Deliberation.
During the deliberation, the results for each stakeholder were presented to the
group for discussion. The stakeholders were in good agreement on the priorities of the
objectives which allowed the deliberation to focus on their major differences, namely the
expected outcomes for the Ability to Detect SNM and CBP Input objectives. Five major
points of discussion shaped the deliberation.
A critical discussion during the deliberation involved resolving the reasons why
stakeholder D rated the Nal-HPGe option higher in Ability to Detect SNM and CBP Input
than the other stakeholders. The discussion revealed a misunderstanding of the
operational constraints for secondary inspections. Stakeholder D assumed a longer dwell
time for the secondary inspections than the other stakeholders. This longer time would
allow the HPGe detectors to outperform the Nal counterparts. Through the course of
deliberation, stakeholder D was convinced by the other stakeholders that the shorter
dwell time was more realistic, and that CBP would prefer Nal detectors to HPGe and
therefore revised his preferences.
A strong discussion during deliberation also focused on the characteristics of the
Hybrid Option. Several of the stakeholders questioned stakeholder C's judgment on how
well the Hybrid option would perform. It became clear quickly that stakeholder C had
misunderstood what combination of detector systems encompassed the hybrid option and
therefore misjudged it. Stakeholder C agreed to revise his expected outcomes after the
misunderstanding was resolved, a change that raised his PI significantly for the hybrid
option. Stakeholder C's top choice remained the Nal-Nal option, but the hybrid moved
into second place.
All the stakeholders were surprised to find the lack of importance of
implementation costs in the final decision. They had recently spent much time and
resources to confirm what those costs would be to support their CBA analysis. These
costs were still being debated with other governmental agencies and had become a major
focus of their efforts. The stakeholders agreed that if the ADP was the primary decision
methodology used for this decision those resources could have been diverted to more
important valuable research and saw this as an advantage of the ADP.
Part of the deliberation also involved stakeholder C discussing why he felt it was
important to separate the Stakeholder Impact category into CBP Input and Terminal
Operator Input instead of grouping both influences under CBP Input as the other
stakeholders had. Stakeholder C stated that the interests of the terminal operator were
strictly business related and directly proportional to throughput. He also observed an
aversion to changes in operations and a mistrust of new technology among this
stakeholder group. The CBP stakeholders, however, were concerned more with the
complexity of the system, the ease of use, and the expected manning requirements for the
systems. Stakeholder C did acknowledge the arguments of the other stakeholders that
CBP's opinions were influenced by the Terminal Operator opinions as well, but did not
think it was a strong enough influence to lump the groups together. In the end, the
analysis showed that this dispute had little impact on the final ranking of the decision
options and the stakeholders agreed to move on.
Finally, the variance of understanding of CBP preferences among the stakeholders
was unexpected. A discussion of each stakeholder's perception of CBP's input was
fruitful in clearing additional misunderstandings, primarily stakeholder D's expectation
of CBP approving the Nal-HPGe option. Through the discussion it became clear that
stakeholder D had not seen the latest position paper from CBP about this program in
which the CBP priorities had been updated. After reviewing the new information
stakeholder D agreed to revise his responses. Furthermore, the DNDO stakeholders
requested that the researcher work with the CBP deputy director responsible for advising
DNDO and quantify his input using the ADP as well.
During the deliberation, discussions of other concerns outside the scope of the
analysis such as public perceptions of the program as well as the uncertainties in expected
outcomes helped to shape the final decision. The stakeholder participation in the ADP
helped them to realize that they were not as sure of the expected outcomes as they
initially believed themselves to be. In light of this, the group decided to proceed
cautiously on a course of action in which they would initially use decision option B,
PVT-Nal, to gather additional data from actual field use of the new systems. If the field
reports indicated that the Nal systems performed as expected, then the decision would be
switched to Hybrid in which Nal systems would be used for primary inspections at major
ports. Finally, if the Nal systems performed as expected in a primary function, then
DNDO would consider switching to Nal-Nal for all ports and border crossings.
DNDO's final Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) is due for a final decision during the
summer of 2008. Their preliminary CBA analysis and discussions have good agreement
with the results from the ADP model and the organization is currently leaning towards
the final decision of this research.
5. CONCLUSION
This paper presented a case study illustrating the use of the Analytic-Deliberative
Process for the selection of radiation portal monitors for shipping ports and border
crossings. Although the final decision option preferences are similar, the ADP holds an
advantage over CBA for these types of decisions in that it quantifies explicitly and
separately both objective and subjective influences that affect the decision. The use of an
Objectives Hierarchy and the Analytic Hierarchy Process provides a rigorous approach to
value modeling that can be implemented and adjusted quickly by executives with
minimal technical assistance.
Additionally, the value functions serve the same purpose of CBA's equivalent
dollar scales, but can add explicitly the additional information of how important those
dollars are to the decision maker. It is clear that attempts to quantify the impact of
nuclear terrorism and stakeholder inputs in terms of dollars can be abstract, subjective,
and uncertain. Quantities such as attack frequency, consequences, and the impact of
countermeasures are clear examples of uncertain and subjective variables that must be
combined to give a dollar estimate of the savings in dollars due to increased safety from
nuclear terrorism. Much more certainty can be associated with quantifying these
outcomes in terms of their value or utility to the decision maker.
Perhaps the greatest strength of the ADP revealed by this research was the
effectiveness of the deliberation following the completion of the analysis. Five major
points of disagreement among the stakeholders were easily identified and discussed.
Four of the disagreements were the results of misunderstandings between the
stakeholders about facts regarding the case study. The deliberation allowed these
misunderstandings to be identified quickly and remedied, which led to good agreement
between stakeholders who disagreed initially.
The stakeholders did not resolve the final disagreement regarding the influence of
terminal operators, but were content to disagree since sensitivity studies indicated their
differences had a minimal impact on the final decision. Similarly, sensitivity studies also
indicated that the final decision was insensitive to implementation costs; an area in which
they had recently focused much of their resources to resolve a debate over these costs
with other governmental agencies. This last case highlights an important strength of the
ADP in that it can focus the deliberation and further research on areas that truly impact
the decision and prevent the wasting of time and resources eliminating uncertainties that
are not actually critical to resolve.
One critique of the use of an ADP type decision methodology for public policy
making is that it relies on the values of the leaders of the responsible agencies instead of
the values of the nation at large. It is true that these two value sets do not necessarily
agree. However, the leaders elected and appointed to these positions are selected for their
wisdom and great insights into the respective areas. A common issue with CBA use in
public policy is that the public's risk perception is often not in good agreement with the
actual risk severity. Nor, does it truly represent the values of the entire society but rather
a portion of society whose preferences are assumed to represent the greater population. It
is fair to say that the leaders of the organizations called to make these public policy
decisions have a deeper understanding of these issues than the general public and are
charged with the public trust to make value judgments on their behalf. Thus, the
arguments supporting the ADP as a legitimate decision methodology for government
agencies appear much stronger than those against.
In matters of governmental spending on national security initiatives, subjective
influences abound. The difficulties in quantifying these influences with CBA leave them
either external to the analysis or hidden within the assumptions. Consensus building can
be challenging in these cases which seems to be evident in the case ofDNDO's selection
of RPM technologies. Therefore, the ADP may be useful to these agencies to better
assist in consensus building and moving decisions forward in a timely manner.
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APPENDIX A: A COMPARISON OF NAI AND HPGE
DETECTORS FOR USE IN RADIATION PORTAL
MONITORS
The chief technical metrics of judging between detectors are resolution,
efficiency, and performance with changing environmental considerations. Detectors used
for radiation spectroscopy produce a response function from the incident radiation that
can graphically be interpreted as a probably density function for the energy level of the
incident radiation. Using this interpretation the resolution is defined as the ratio of the
full width of the response function measured at half of the maximum peak value
(FWHM) to peak height Ho. (Knoll, 2000)
F WHMRe solution = (A. 1)
H0
HPGe detectors have energy resolutions a factor of 30 better than Nal detectors,
with resolutions of <1% and 5-10%, respectively (Knoll, 2000). One reason why the Nal
resolution is lower is because its energy resolution is affected by its intrinsic crystal
resolution (related to light output), the performance of the photomultiplier tube (PMT),
and photocathode. The HPGe detector's resolution, however, is a simple function of the
solid state semiconductor material. HPGe's superior resolution gives it a markedly better
ability to separate overlapping peaks, detect peaks in the presence of strong background
noise, and to make precise calculations of gamma ray energies, thus making it
advantageous in situations with masking by Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials
(NORM) or shielding by a high Z substance is likely. For a more in depth discussion on
the effect of NORM see appendix B.
The efficiency of a detector is primarily determined by the density of the material
and its atomic number or Z value. Because all gammas must be slowed for detection, a
detector's efficiency is proportional to the medium's stopping power (Phillips, Nagel, and
Coffey, 2005). Nal detectors have a greater gamma absorption capability than HPGe
detectors because their Z value is nearly three times that of HPGe (81 as opposed to 32)
and therefore have a greater stopping power. Thus, the Nal detector has a higher
efficiency overall when comparing detectors of equal size. Finally, although HPGe
generally outperforms Nal, HPGe detectors do not detect a majority of the incident
gammas at lower energies. Overall, the HPGe detector's peak efficiency is lower than
that of a Nal detector of equal size, but with its superior energy resolution and isotopic
identification capability it still outperforms a Nal detector. Additionally, the minimum
detectable activity (MDA) of source material will be lower for the HPGe detector which
makes it more reliable for identifying trace signatures.
For real-world applications the technical advantages of these systems must be
balanced out with various practical considerations. The most technically sophisticated
system is not the best choice unless it is also cost effective, manufacturable, and robust,
among other practical factors. These practical concerns are often dominant in
determining the radiation system of choice.
Nal detectors have many practical advantages over HPGe detectors. When we
look at both detector systems in terms of cost, the Nal detectors are the clear winner. The
direct costs of Nal detectors are about half that of a comparable HPGe detector. When
we look at the size of the two detection systems in the context of maneuverability and
maintenance, HPGe initially appears to be the clear choice since it is approximately six
times smaller than an equivalent Nal system. However, an HPGe detector system
requires an external cooling system in order to operate. This fact will not only increase
the size of the HPGe system, but also drive the system cost up even more. Additionally,
the cooling systems required for HPGe systems are often sensitive to failure and can
decrease the overall reliability of the detection system. Additionally, the durability of the
HPGe systems is uncertain while the Nal systems have been successfully employed in
field conditions for many years. Therefore, the decision makers must be willing to accept
some risk in durability if they select the HPGe systems of Nal.
Another practical issue concerns the amount of time needed in order to do a scan.
Nal systems can perform a scan relatively quickly (seconds) while the HPGe system
requires a longer scan time (minutes) in order to maintain the same level of sensitivity.
Thus, from a practical perspective, Nal radiation detection systems appear advantageous
over HPGe systems (Ely, Siciliano, and Kouzes, 2004).
Thus, the decision facing DNDO to choose between Nal and HPGe detectors is
clearly complex and will have an immense impact on National Security. Technical
considerations seem to favor HPGe detectors, while practical considerations favor Nal
detectors and stakeholder considerations fall somewhere in between. All relevant factors
should be considered and the best choice for this particular application should be selected
using a methodology that allows for objective analysis as well as decision maker
deliberations. ADP provides such a methodology and may very useful in ensuring the
best possible course of action is selected.
APPENDIX B: THE IMPACT OF NATURALLY
OCCURRING RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS (NORM) ON
DETECTING SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS AT PORTS
AND BORDER CROSSINGS
Countries around the world are deploying radiation detection instruments to
interdict the illegal shipment of radioactive material crossing international borders. Of
particular concern is the shipment of Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) including various
isotopes of plutonium (238Pu, 239pU, 240Pu and 241Pu) and enriched uranium (235U) which
could be used to fashion a nuclear weapon. To detect the presence of these materials at
border crossings most countries rely on RPMs to detect the presence of gamma radiation.
Radionuclides emit gamma radiation at distinct energy levels which can act as a
radiological fingerprint. However, complications can occur in isotope identification if
NORM is present. The significance of this complication involves both the frequency in
which we encounter NORM in screening cargo at borders and how effectively it can
mask SNM.
A quick review of literature reveals that radioactive materials in cargo are fairly
common. Typical products containing NORM include those listed in table 9. This table
is adopted from Kouzes (Kouzes, et al., 2003) and outlines the materials that most
frequently cause alarms at border crossings:
Table 9: Radioactive Materials Causing Alarms at US Border Crossirngs from Kouzes. 2003
Radioactive Materials Causing Alarms at US Border Crossings









Toilet bowls & tile 4%
Trucks/cars 2%
Additional alarms can occur when passengers are present who have undergone
medical treatments involving radioactive isotopes. Kouzes estimates that 1 out of every
2600 Americans carry enough radioactivity from medical treatments to set off typical
border crossing radiological alarms.
The effect of NORM on properly identifying SNM sources depends on the type of
NORM present and the suspected type of SNM. Most NORM sources originate from
four radioisotopes: 40K, 226Ra, 238U, and 232Th. Of these, the most problematic appears to
be 226Ra. This isotope emits gamma radiation at 186.2 kev which is close enough to the
235U radiation peak at 185.7 kev to confuse most detectors without very high resolution.
This is a serious complication since the 235 U peak is weak and provides the only
radioactive signature for this isotope. Plutonium is much more radioactive and generally
found with several different radioisotopes present. This provides a more distinctive
gamma signature which cannot be masked by NORM. Table 10 provides a snapshot of
important gamma peaks for plutonium and how NORM radiation peaks would fit into a
plutonium spectrum.
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Table 10: Plutonium Gamma Spectroscopy Useful Peaks and NORM From Hsue et. al, 1980
Hence, NORM certainly plays a significant role in assessing the capabilities of a
radiation portal monitor's ability to interdict the smuggling of SNM. NORM in cargo
appears frequently and must be planned for. Gamma ray spectroscopy techniques can
provide an excellent fingerprint for radio-nuclides such as plutonium when NORM is
present but may provide unclear results when attempting to identify HEU because of
possible masking. Thus, excellent resolution and a well thought out inspection plan are
critical to providing protection from SNM smuggling.
Plutonium Gamma Spectroscopy Useful Peaks and NORM
Region Useful Peaks Source Norm Peaks Source
40-60 43.48 PU-238
45.23 PU-240
51.63 PU-239 49.5 U-238
59.54 AM-241 63.8 TH-232






120-450 125.29 AM-241 113.5 U-238
129.9 PU-239
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APPENDIX C. A DISCUSSION OF THE USE OF COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS FOR PUBLIC POLICY MAKING
C. 1 Historical Background
The first formal thoughts regarding the use of a Cost-Benefit type analysis for
public policy decision making are usually attributed to Vilfredo Pareto from whom we
get the concept of the Pareto Optimum (Pareto, 1896). The Pareto Optimum is a
common-sense notion that considers a policy change an improvement if at least some
people are made better off and no one is made worse off. Its common-sense appeal
appears to make it a good criterion for public policy making; however, its standard is
impossible to obtain in most real-world situations. In virtually all public policy
decisions, someone winds up worse off in order for others to benefit. Thus, most Cost-
Benefit Analyses (CBA) today use a revision to Pareto's original work put forth by
Nicholas Kaldor and John Hicks in 1939 (Layard, 1972). This revision accepts a policy
change if the total gains and total losses of the winners and losers are such that the
winners could theoretically compensate the losers and still come out ahead. This is
known as the Kaldor-Hicks criterion and is generally used as the foundational criterion
for modern day CBA. Since then, CBA has grown into an entire field of study in itself.
CBA has long been used by businesses to analyze potential investments and
formally became a part of public policy decision making in 1981. That year President
Reagan signed executive order 12291 which mandated "No actions by federal agencies
should be taken unless they result in a positive net value to society." This overarching,
mandate forced the federal government to fully embrace CBA methods but quickly
became overly arduous to the agencies required to conduct these analyses. To alleviate
this bureaucratic burden, President Clinton signed executive order 12866 in 1993 which
required a regulatory analysis to be prepared for all "significant regulatory actions".
Significant regulatory actions identified in the order were defined as: having an annual
effect on the economy exceeding $100 million, adversely affecting jobs, the environment
or public health and safety, seriously interfering with another agency's action, or raising
novel legal or policy issues outside legal mandates and Presidential priorities. ( US EPA,
2000) Thus, the case study at hand clearly meets both the public health and safety and
monetary requirements and is subject to a CBA before the a final decision can be made.
C.2 Decision Metrics
To conduct a CBA, the federal government attempts to quantify all the costs and
benefits associated with a proposed policy change. Once these are quantified, there are
several decision criteria that exist for determining the best option including Net Present
Worth, Benefit-Cost Ratio, and Internal Rate of Return (IRR). The Office of
Management and Budget recommended in 1992 that all federal agencies use the Net
Present Worth method and this has since become the standard federal approach (OMB,
1992).
In calculating the net present worth of decision alternatives both current and
future costs and benefits must be considered simultaneously. To accomplish this,
monetary values in the future are adjusted for inflation to yield a net present value.
Similarly, the future public benefits (such as the use of a park to be built 10 years from
now) are adjusted to their present value through a social discount rate. The moral
implications of social discounting have been debated
at length. Shrader-Frechette argues that social discounting is dangerous as it
overburdens future generations (Shrader-Frechette, 2000) while Belzer argues strongly in
favor social discounting as generations have always given and taken from each other
(Belzer, 2000). Nonetheless, both inflation and social discounting are generally used
today in federally performed CBAs.
C.3 Quantifying Costs
The costs of a decision include actual, physical costs of a decision as well as the
indirect costs of negative social impacts among others. The costs of a policy decision can
be generally classified into five subcategories: Real-resource compliance costs,
Government regulatory costs, social welfare costs, transitional costs and indirect costs
(US EPA, 2000).
Real-resource compliance costs include purchase, installation, operation and
maintenance of equipment, changes in production or processing capabilities, and the cost
of time spent on paperwork. In our case study the real-resource costs would include the
purchase price and installation of the detector systems, the manpower costs to the
Customs and Border Protection Agency (CBP) to operate the systems, and their
associated maintenance costs among others.
Government regulatory costs include things such as the cost of administration,
monitoring, and enforcement of regulations. For our case study, these would include the
cost of DNDO oversight into the operation of the new detector systems as well as system
training for CBP personnel.
Social welfare costs generally refer to losses in consumer and producer surplus
due to a rise in price or decrease in output of a good or service. The slowdown in stream
of commerce in our case study would fall into this category and is a major concern to the
decision makers. As false positives slow down commerce processing through the ports,
fewer goods can enter the country and their associated prices will increase.
Transitional costs are temporary costs associated with implementing the new
policy. For our case study costs such as implementation and reconfiguring the ports to
support the new detector systems could be classified as transitional costs.
Indirect costs include effects new policies may have on markets and society that
are not be associated directly with the new policy and can be difficult to measure. These
costs may include things such as changes in market structure, (i.e., companies leaving a
market due to increased regulation), product quality, (focus diverted from product quality
to regulation compliance), or discouraged investment (regulated activity may not be as
attractive to investors). One example of an indirect cost in our case study is a high false-
positive rate resulting in fewer companies shipping goods to the US because of the hassle
of getting their cargo through the ports.
C.4 Quantifying Benefits
The benefits of a policy decision are analyzed by attempting to quantify the
Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) and Willingness-to-Accept (WTA) of the public for the
different benefits associated with the potential policy change. For example, a CBA
conducted by the Department of Transportation may want to assess how much the public
is willing to pay in vehicle prices for additional safety features in new automobiles. They
may also want to assess how much additional risk of accidents the public is willing to
accept to raise the speed limit on a certain stretch of road. Three different types of
methods have been developed to quantify benefits in this way, each of which is used in
different circumstances in practice. In order of preference the three methods are revealed
preferences, stated preferences, and benefit transfer (Stavins, 2006).
Revealed preference methods use people's observed behavior to infer their WTP
or WTA for public goods and services. For example, analysts can use revealed
preferences to estimate the value of quality school systems and living environments by
observing differences in housing prices for the same size and quality of house in different
neighborhoods. Similarly, analysts can estimate the value of safety by comparing the
salaries of similar jobs performed under different conditions. For example, contractors
working in Iraq are paid a premium by the US government due to added hazards of their
working environment. Revealed preference methods are generally considered the most
accurate. However, the use of this technique depends on the situation and is not always
appropriate. In particular, assessing the benefits of the non-use of an asset can be
difficult to conduct revealed preferences. Examples would include the value of
preserving National Parks for future generations or the National Oil Strategic Reserve.
Stated preference methods usually involved administering a highly structured
survey to consumers/citizens to determine the value they place on a good or service.
These surveys are subject to the biases of the interviewees and can be very time
consuming and expensive when properly done. Nonetheless, for situations in which
revealed preference methods are not available these methods are sometimes used.
Benefit transfer methods are considered the least accurate but are more commonly
used because they are relatively cheap and fast. The essence of this technique is to find
examples of quantified benefit values from other situations and attempt to apply them
current decision problem. An example of this type of method is assessing the increase in
commerce in one city after an infrastructure improvement project and assuming it will be
similar in another city after a similar project is completed. These approximations can be
reasonable when the baseline and degree of change between projects are similar, the basic
commodities are essentially equivalent, and the affected populations are similar. In our
case study a benefit transfer method is necessary to estimate the value of lives saved by
purchasing the advanced detection systems and this represents the biggest weakness in
the use of CBA techniques for these types of analyses as argued by French (French,
Bedford and Atherton, 2005)
C.5 The Value of a Statistical Life (VSL)
The value of a statistical life (VSL) is the term used by analysts to discuss the
question of how much value people assess to reductions in the risk of mortality. VSL
calculations do not represent the value of life in ethical terms, technical, or economic
terms. Rather, it is simply a convention used to express people's stated or revealed
marginal valuation for a small change in risk. As an example, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) typically uses a VSL of around $6 million in their calculations.
This number does not mean an individual would pay $6 million to avoid certain death or
accept certain death for $6 million. Instead, it means that a population of several
thousand people would be willing to pay $6 million together to prevent the certain death
of one of them chosen at random. VSL estimates have a large variance and must be
subject to large sensitivity studies. Table 11 below is a list of VSL estimates adopted by
the EPA as policy relevant in 2000. From these estimates the EPA has derived a VSL
probability distribution as Weibull with a mean of $5.8 million in 1997 dollars (US EPA,
2000).
Table 11:VSL estimates considered policy-relevant.
From Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses, US EPA, 2000.
VSL Studies adopted by EPA as policy-relevent
(Mean values in 1997 dollars)
Study Method Value of Statistical Life
Kneisner and Leeth (1991 - U.S.) Labor Market $0.7 million
Smith and Gilbert (1984) Labor Market $0.8 million
Dillingham (1985) Labor Market $1.1 million
Butler (1983) Labor Market $1.3 million
Miller and Guria (1991) Contingent Valuation $1.5 million
Moore and Viscusi (1988) Labor Market $3.0 million
Viscusi, Magat and Huber (1991) Contingent Valuation $3.3 million
Marin and Psacharopoulos (1982) Labor Market $3.4 million
Gegax et al. (1985) Contingent Valuation $4.0 million
Kneisner and Leeth (1991 - Australia) Labor Market $4.0 million
Gerking, de Haan and Schulze (1988) Contingent Valuation $4.1 million
Cousineau, Lecroix and Girard (1988) Labor Market $4.4 million
Jones-Lee (1989) Contingent Valuation $4.6 million
Dillingham (1985) Labor Market $4.7 million
Viscusi (1978, 1979) Labor Market $5.0 million
R.S. Smith (1976) Labor Market $5.6 million
V.K. Smith (1976) Labor Market $5.7 million
Olson (1981) Labor Market $6.3 million
Viscusi (1981) Labor Market $7.9 million
R.S. Smith (1974) Labor Market $8.7 million
Moore and Viscusi (1988) Labor Market $8.8 million
Kneisner and Leeth (1991 - Japan) Labor Market $9.2 million
Herzog and Schlottman (1987) Labor Market $11.0 million
Leigh and Folsom (1984) Labor Market $11.7 million
Leigh (1987) Labor Market $12.6 million
Garen (1988) Labor Market $16.3 million
Derived from EPA (1997) and Viscusi (1992).
To calculate the benefits in this case study due to the decrease in expected loss of
life, an equation such as equation 3 must be used.
MCS = A, x F x VSL (C.1)
where MCS is the Mortality Cost Savings, 2, is the reduction in the expected number of
nuclear terrorism events due the implementation of the decision, F is the expected
number of fatalities for a single nuclear terrorism event, and VSL is the value of a
statistical life. Although it is possible to create estimates of each of these parameters,
their uncertainties are unavoidably extreme. This makes the assessment of MCS highly
dependent on the assumptions made in estimating its parameters and thus subjective in
nature. This unavoidable subjectivity is the biggest problem in using CBA for this case
study as it is somewhat hidden in these assumptions. Conversely, the ADP makes the
subjectivity of its analysis explicit and more straightforward for discussion.
C.6 A Comparison of Cost-Benefit Analysis and Decision
Analysis
French et al. present a good critique and comparison of CBA and DA and argue
that DA is more appropriate for making safety decisions in the French nuclear power
industry (French, Bedford and Atherton, 2005). The differences in these two theories as
presented by French are summarized below.
As described earlier in this text DA is an explicitly subjective decision
methodology while CBA attempts to be explicitly objective. DA methods involve value
tradeoffs to determine priorities from the perspective of a specific decision maker. CBA
attempts to model the values of society as a whole. While the intentions of CBA in this
respect are laudable subjectivity inevitably finds it way into the analysis in the form of
how the analyst chooses to model societal values. Since CBA is market based, large
variances in perceived costs and benefits can abound from different market scenarios for
the same good. Clearly different demographics of the US have different aversions to risk,
and value everything from natural resources to houses to security differently. How the
analyst captures these values can greatly influence the decision.
One perceived advantage of CBA is that it forces consistency in value tradeoffs
from decision to decision. Since the analyst in theory does not choose the value
preferences that are used in the analysis they remain constant for each new decision that
arises. DA gives the decision maker the flexibility to re-evaluate his or her value
tradeoffs for each new situation which may be perceived as a problem when making
decisions on behalf of the public. The consistency advantage of CBA over DA is
mitigated in two ways: first French argues that databanks and records of value tradeoffs
can be stored and used as a start point for sensitivity studies in future decision problems,
second some degree of changing values should be expected from problem to problem. A
classic example of this is the different levels of risk the public is willing to accept when
traveling by aircraft as opposed to traveling by car. The public has always demanded
much higher safety standards for airline travel than automobile travel even though the
airlines have been shown to be much safer (US DOT, 2002).
CBA and DA also differ in their treatment of costs and benefits that are actualized
through time. Since CBA is tied to market valuations of costs and benefits it forces the
analyst to treat future costs and benefits using an inflation/discount rate or not at all.
Other Ad Hoc techniques have been attempted to adjust these figures but none are
theoretically justified. Since DA ties costs and benefits to their value to the decision
maker it provides more flexibility in the treatment of costs and benefits through time. For
Example, French describes one of several techniques used in discounted utility theory
(DUT) known as hyperbolic discounting which can model the devaluation of future
utility much slower than an equivalent discount rate but still accounts for a decision
maker that is timing averse.
Finally, when multiple stakeholders are involved DA can formally incorporate a
deliberation phase (as it does in our version) in which consensus building can occur.
Since CBA theoretically encompasses everyone's values a priori there is no deliberation
phase. In reality debate almost always follows these analyses. However, this debate
must be framed as a critique of analytical techniques as opposed to a discussion over
what the priorities should be for the project. Since the values underlying the decision are
debated indirectly this can be a long and slow process as evidenced by this case study.
APPENDIX D. ANALYTIC HIERARCHY PROCESS AND
VALUE FUNCTION QUESTIONNAIRES AND RESULT
SUMMARIES FOR THE FOUR STAKEHOLDERS.
The following pages contain samples of the questionnaires given to each
stakeholder to elicit his values and preferences. The resulting objective weights are
calculated using Saaty's relative comparison technique outlined in reference 19 and the
value functions were calculated using a variant of Clemen's ratio technique (Clemen,
1996).
The Analytic Hierarchy Process Pair Wise Comparison Worksheet
for DNDO's Passive Spectroscopic Portal Monitor Procurement
Decision
This worksheet is designed to assist the decision maker in assigning logical
weights to the decision criteria he or she is using to decide between prototypes for
spectroscopic portal monitor systems.
Instructions: For each pair of criteria presented please circle the pair you feel is more
important to the achieving the specific objective indicated above the pair. Then circle
the number which best describes how much more important you judge that criteria to be.
Use the following chart to interpret what the numbers represent:[1]
Intensity of Definition Explanation
Importance
1 Equal Importance Two activities contribute equally
to the objective
2 Weak
3 Moderate Importance Experience and judgment slightly
favor one activity over another
4 Moderate Plus
5 Strong Importance Experience and judgment srongly
favor one activity over another
6 Strong Plus
7 Very Strong Importance An activity is favored very
strongly over another; its
dominance is demonstrated in
practice
8 Very, very Strong
9 Extreme Importance The evidence favoring one
activity over another is of the
highest possible order of
affirmation
Note: The scale is intended for the decision maker to make evaluations using the odd
numbers and bold levels. The even numbers are intended for use when a compromise
must be reached between multiple parties completing the exercise.
Objective: Maximize Benefits of Detector Deployment
Criteria: Stakeholder Impact vs. Cost Impact
Intensity of Importance:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Criteria: Stakeholder Impact vs. National Security Impact
Intensity of Importance:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Criteria: Cost Impact vs. National Security Impact
Intensity of Importance:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Comments:
Obiective: Minimize Cost
Criteria: Cost of False Positives vs. Implementation Costs
Intensity of Importance:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Criteria: Cost of False Positives vs. Maintenance and Life Cycle Costs
Intensity of Importance:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Criteria: Implementation Costs vs. Maintenance and Life Cycle Costs
Intensity of Importance:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Objective: Maximize National Security
Comments:
Criteria: Capability to Detect RDD Materials vs. Capability to Detect SNM
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Ouantification of Value Functions associated with
Constructed Scales
In this section we will quantify the value functions for each constructed scale
agreed upon by the decision maker. The Method for computing the scales is a
combination of the Ratio Method as discussed in Clemen.[2] and the pair wise
comparison methodology used by Saaty in the Analytic Hierarchy Process[l].
Instructions: For each pair of values from the constructed scale, please circle the number
which represents how important it would be to have a system that achieves the higher
level of objective fulfillment.
Intensity of Definition Explanation
Importance
1 Equal Importance Two activities contribute equally
to the objective
2 Weak
3 Moderate Importance Experience and judgment slightly
favor one objective fulfillment
level over another
4 Moderate Plus
5 Strong Importance Experience and judgment
strongly favor one objective
fulfillment level over another
6 Strong Plus
7 Very Strong Importance One objective fulfillment level is
favored very strongly over
another; its dominance is
demonstrated in practice
8 Very, very Strong
9 Extreme Importance The evidence favoring one
objective fulfillment level over
another is of the highest possible
order of affirmation




Major Objections: CBP anticipates significant complications integrating the alternative.
CBP considers this alternative no better than the current system or possibly worse.
Minor Objections: CBP would clearly prefer a different alternative than the one chosen
but can implement it with minor complications
Ambivalence: CBP finds this alternative acceptable, but it would prefer a different one.
Approval: CBP recommends and approves of the chosen alternative
Criteria: Comments
Major Objections vs. Minor Objections
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Minor Objections vs. Ambivalence
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Ambivalence vs. Approval
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Objective: Minimize Cost of False Positives
Constructed Scale:
Poor: Defined as a False Positive (Nuisance Alarm) Rate of>75% for containers w/
NORM
Fair: Defined as a False Positive (Nuisance Alarm) Rate of 25-75% for container w/
NORM
Good: Defined as a False Positive Rate of 5-25% for containers w/ NORM
Excellent: Defined as a False Positive Rate of <5% for containers w/ NORM
Criteria: Comments:
Poor vs. Fair
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Fair vs. Good
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Good vs. Excellent
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Objective: Minimize Implementation Costs
Constructed Scale:
High: Defined as cost per system >$500,000
Medium: Defined as cost per system $100,000-$500,000
Low: Defined as cost per system <$100,000
Critera:
High vs. Medium
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Medium vs. Low
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Comments
Objective: Minimize Maintenance and Life Cycle (M&LC) Costs
Constructed Scale:
High M&LC: Defined as cost per system >$80,000
Medium M&LC: Defined as cost per system $20,000-$80,000
Low M&LC: Defined as cost per system <$20,000
Criteria:
High M&LC vs. Medium M&LC
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Medium M&LC vs. Low M&LC
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Comments
Objective: Maximize Capability to detect Radiological Dispersion Device (RDD)
Materials
Constructed Scale:
Poor RDD Detection: Defined as false negative rate >20% for design basis scenarios
Average RDD Detection: Defined as false negative rate 5-20% for design basis
scenarios
Good RDD Detection: Defined as false negatives 2-5% for design basis scenarios
Excellent RDD Detection: Defined as false negatives 2-5% for design basis scenarios
Criteria: Comments:
Poor RDD Detection vs. Medium RDD Detection
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Medium RDD Detection vs. Good RDD Detection
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Good RDD Detection vs. Excellent RDD Detection
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Objective: Maximize Capability to detect Special Nuclear Materials (SNM)
Constructed Scale:
Poor SNM Detection: Defined as false negative rate >20% for design basis scenarios
Average SNM Detection: Defined as false negative rate 5-20% for design basis
scenarios
Good SNM Detection: Defined as false negatives 2-5% for design basis scenarios
Excellent SNM Detection: Defined as false negatives <2% for design basis scenarios
Criteria:
Poor SNM Detection vs. Medium SNM Detection
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Medium SNM Detection vs. Good SNM Detection
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Good SNM Detection vs. Excellent SNM Detection





D. I Summary of Results from Questionnaires
Summary of Analytical Hierarchy Process Results for Stakeholder A
Impact Categories
Stakeholders Cost National Security Weights
Stakeholders 1 1/3 1/7 0.081
Cost 3 1 1/5 0.188
National Security 7 5 1 0.731
Inconsistency= .062
Cost
False Positives Implementation Life Cycle and Maintenance Weights
False Positives 1 3 1/3 0.281
Implementation 1/3 1 1/3 0.135
Life Cycle and Maintenance 3 3 1 0.584
Inconsistency= .13
National Security
Ability to Detect RDD Ability to Detect SNM Weights
Ability to Detect RDD 1 1/7 0.125
Ability to Detect SNM 7 1 0.875
Inconsistency= 0
Objectives Weight
Ability to Detect SNM 0.63963
Cost of Life Cycle and Maintenance 0.10979
Ability to Detect RDD 0.09138
CBP Input 0.08100
Cost of False Positives 0.05283
Cost of Implementation 0.02538
Summary of Analytical Hierarchy Process Results for Stakeholder B
Attributes
Stakeholders Cost National Security Weights
Stakeholders 1 4 1/6 0.176
Cost 1/4 1 1/9 0.061
National Security 6 9 1 0.763
Inconsistency= .104
Cost
False Positives Implementation Life Cycle and Maintenance Weights
False Positives 1 3 1/4 0.218
Implementation 1/3 1 1/6 0.091
Life Cycle and Maintenance 4 6 1 0.691
Inconsistency .052
National Security
Ability to Detect RDD Ability to Detect SNM Weights
Ability to Detect RDD 1 1/9 0
Ability to Detect SNM 9 1 8/9
Inconsistency= 0
Objectives Performance Index
Ability to Detect SNM 0.68670
CBP Input 0.17600
Ability to Detect RDD 0.07630
Cost of Life Cycle and Maintenance 0.04215
Cost of False Positives 0.01330
Cost of Implementation 0.00555
Summary of Analytical Hierarchy Process Results for Stakeholder C
Attributes
Stakeholders Cost National Security Weights
Stakeholders 1 7 1/7 0.197
Cost 1/7 1 1/8 0.051
National Security 7 8 1 0.752
Inconsistency= .362
Cost
False Positives Implementation Life Cycle and Maintenance Weights
False Positives 1 7 5 0.701
Implementation 1/7 1 1/7 0.059
Life Cycle and Maintenance 1/5 7 1 0.240
Inconsistency .283
National Security
Ability to Detect RDD Ability to Detect SNM Weights
Ability to Detect RDD 1 1/8 0.111
Ability to Detect SNM 8 1 0.889
Inconsistency= 0
Stakeholder Impact
Ability to Detect RDD Ability to Detect SNM Weights
CBP Input 1 1/7 0.125
Terminal Operator Input 7 1 0.875
Inconsistency= 0
Objectives Performance Index
Ability to Detect SNM 0.6685
Terminal Operator Input 0.1724
Ability to Detect RDD 0.0835
Cost of False Positives 0.0358
CBP Input 0.0246
Cost of Life Cycle and Maintenance 0.0122
Cost of Implementation 0.0030
Summary of Analytical Hierarchy Process Results for Stakeholder D
Impact Categories
Stakeholders Cost National Security Weights
Stakeholders 1 1/3 1/7 0.081
Cost 3 1 1/5 0.188
National Security 7 5 1 0.731
Inconsistency= .062
Cost
False Positives Implementation Life Cycle and Maintenance Weights
False Positives 1 3 1/3 0.281
Implementation 1/3 1 1/3 0.135
Life Cycle and Maintenance 3 3 1 0.584
Inconsistency= .13
National Security
Ability to Detect RDD Ability to Detect SNM Weights
Ability to Detect RDD 1 1/7 0.125
Ability to Detect SNM 7 1 0.875
Inconsistency= 0
Objectives Weight
Ability to Detect SNM 0.63963
Cost of Life Cycle and Maintenance 0.10979
Ability to Detect RDD 0.09138
CBP Input 0.08100
Cost of False Positives 0.05283




















Value Function Results for Stakeholder A






















































Life Cycle and Maintenance Costs I
Summary of Unweighted








































































Ability to Detect SNM
Level Value
Poor 0.000
Average 0.143
Good 0.714
Excellent 1.000
